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by Kevin F O'Neill
Sccelerated History of Expressive Freedom
My purpose in writ-
ing this article is to
examine the growth
of Anglo-American
speech rights over
the past millennium.
Since the best mea-
sure of expressive
freedom is the free-
dom to criticize
one's government, I
will focus on the regulation of seditious
speech in an accelerated tour of history,
from die printing press to the present day.
In England, statutes criminalizing utter-
ances critical of the government date from
the 13th century. The invention of print-
ing in the I5th century magnified the dan-
ger of such opinions, and led to harsher
and more pervasive controls on seditious
speech. In 1579, the right hand of an
author was chopped off as punishment for
his written attack on the proposed mar-
riage between Queen Elizabeth and the
Duke of Anjou. In 1603, at the end of
Elizabeth's reign, a printer was hanged,
drawn and quartered for publishing a book
that opposed the ascension of James I to
the throne. In 1683, Algernon Sidney was
beheaded for suggesting - in an unpub-
lished treatise discovered in his study - that
the king was accountable to the people.
Such putishment was justified on two
complementary grounds: affairs of state
were no business of the people, and self-
preservation required the government to
suppress any voice of dissent. In 1620, for
example, James I issued a proclamation,
asserting that political issues "are no
Theames, or subjects fit for vulgar persons,
or common meetings."'
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Presiding over a seditious libel trial in
1704, Chief Justice Holt instructed the
jury: "If [speakers] should not be called
to account for possessing the people with
an ill opinion of the government, no gov-
ernment can subsist. For it is very neces-
sary for all governments that the people
should have a good opinion of it," The
Queen v. Tutch in, 14 Howell's State Trials
1095, 1128 (Q.B. I704). In suppressing
dissent, the English crown and Parliament
employed three principal devices: the doc-
trine of constructive treason, the licensing
of the press and the law of seditious libel.
Constructive Treason
The Statute of Treasons, enacted in 1350,
made it a crime to "compass or imagine"
the king's death, Conviction under this
statute required some overt act as a step
toward toppling the king. Expressing a dis-
sident opinion did not violate the statute.
However, starting with the reign of Henry
VIII and continuing late into the I7th cen-
tury, the definition of treason came to
embrace mere utteranmes critical of the gov-
ernment. This dramatic departure from the
medieval definition, authorizing conviction
and death for a purely verbal crime,
became known as "constructive" treason.
A notorious example of constructive trea-
son is the prosecution of John Twyn, tried
in 1663 for pubhshing a book that postu-
lated a right of revolution on the grounds
that the king was accountable to the peo-
ple. Twyn was sentenced to be hanged, cut
down while still alive, and then emasculat-
ed, disemboweled, quartered and beheaded
- the standard punishment for treason,
After executing a teenager in 1720 for
printing a dissident pamphlet, the crown
finally abandoned the use of constructive
treason. By then, Parliament had imposed
procedural obstacles to such prosecutions,
and juries, viewing the death penalts as
too drastic a punishment, had grown
reluctant to convict.
Licensing of the Press
In addition to constructive treason, the
English government employed a second
method in controlling the spread of dan-
gerous ideas: the licensing of the press.
Spurred by the invention of printing in the
late 15th century, the English crown
asserted the power to unpose editorial
control over all printed matter. Established
initially as a right of royal prerogative, this
licensing system criminalized the publica-
tion of any work that had not received
advance approval by agents of the crown.
From the middle of the 16th century
through the end of the I7th century, the
licensing system served as a powerful
clamp on dissent: It afforded the crown
prepublication censorship and easy prose-
cution of offenders. The penalties for
unlicensed printing included confiscation
of all goods and chattels, imposition of
fines and imprisonment at the will of the
crown, and the posting of bonds to be
forfeited upon further misbehavior. These
penalties were designed in part to exert so
much pressure upon printers that they
could be tempted to assist the crown and
disclose the whereabouts of dissident
authors. Licensing finally ceased in 1694,
but not from any nascent commitment to
free speech. Instead, as the number of
printers and presses grew, the system
became unwieldy, ineffective and con-
ducive to bribery.
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The Doctrine of Seditious Libel
By 1769, with licensing a thing of the past,
Sir William Blackstone observed, "The lib-
erty of the press is indeed essential to the
nature of a free state [-] but this consists in
laying no previous restraints upon publica-
tions, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published." Freedom
from prior restraint was cold comfort for
authors and printers, because post-publica-
tion punishment (even with the demise of
constructive treason) could be so easily
effected through yet another device: the
doctrine of seditious libel.
Closely akin to constructive treason, and
featuring penalties nearly as severe, the doc-
trine of seditious libel was broad enough
to criminalize any comment critical of the
government. Born in the Star Chamber in
1606, the doctrine did nor die when that
tribunal was abolished in 1641. Through
the intervention of Charles II, seditious
libel was declared a common law offense in
1680, and thus within the jurisdiction of
the Kings Bench, The King s. Harris, 7
Cobbett's State Trials 925, 929-30 (K.B.
1680) (Scroggs, L.C.J.). After 1689, con-
comitant prosecutions were carried out by
Parliament itself, as both the Lords and the
Commons vigorously pursued any publica-
tion critical of their actions.
As a creature of the Star Chamber, sedi-
tious libel was not initially subject to the
procedural restrictions that prevailed in the
common law courts: indictment and trial
by jury. When the Star Chamber was abol-
ished and seditious libel actions moved to
the common law courts, the crown pushed
for procedural innovations that would limit
the power of juries to acquit. One such
method was to bypass the grand jury,
authorizing the attorney general to pro-
ceed on information, rather than indict-
ment. Another method, even more signifi-
cant, was to limit the range of issues that
juries were permitted to decide.
In 1680, at the crown's behest, Chief
Justice Scroggs established that juries in
seditious libel prosecutions were permitted
to decide only one issue: whether the
defendant had actually published the
remark. The judges reserved for them-
selves, as a question of law, whether the
remark constituted seditious libel. Truth
was no defense, and malicious intent to
cause sedition did not need to be proven.
In this way, the King's Bench perpetuated
the crown's prerogative power over sedi-
tious libel, much in the tradition of the
infamous Star Chamber.
In contrast to the hundreds of seditious
libel trials conducted in England during
the 17th and 18th centuries, the number
in prerevolutionary America was insignifi-
cant, probably not more than half a
dozen. Among these, the most famous was
the trial of John Peter Zenger in 1735.
Zenger, a printer, was prosecuted for pub-
lishing a series of attacks on the British
colonial governor of New York. Andrew
Hamilton, Zenger's lawyer, pressed for
procedural changes that would give juries
greater power to acquit. The chief justice
repudiated Hamilton's arguments as
inconsistent with prevailing law, but the
jury found them compelling and, after
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deliberating for only a few minutes,
returned a general verdict of not guilty -
prompting shouts of celebration in the
crowded courtroom. The Zenger trial was
the last of its kind under the royal judges;
on the revolution's eve, grand juries thwart-
ed such prosecutions by refusing to indict.
However, this did not mean that political
dissent went unpunished. Imitating
Parliament, the colonial assemblies took to
prosecuting and imprisoning those who
spoke out against them, Even after the rev-
olution, seditious libel remained a power-
fid tool for suppressing dissent - but by
then, it was used by the states to punish
loyalist expression.
The First Amendment
Unknown - and unknowable - is the
extent to which the First Amendment was
intended to depart from English law in
affording protection for utterances critical
of the government. This is because there
were two starkly different realities that pre-
vailed at the time: established law was
harshly repressive, but the behavior of the
press was remarkably free. Since those who
framed and ratified the First Amendment
said virtually nothing about the specific
fi-eedoms it would afford, we are left to
wonder: Did they choose to protect the
broad liberty actually practiced by the
press or the sharply truncated privilege
embodied in existing law?
Any answer to this question must account
for the long shadow cast by the Sedition
Act of 1798. Enacted olyd seven years
after the First Amendment's ratification,
the Sedition Act criminalized opinions
critical of Congress or the president. If
Congress could pass such a law, if promi-
nent founders like Alexander Hamilton
and William Paterson could support it and
if the federal courts could unanimously
uphold it, just what did the First
Amendment mean in providing that,
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press"?
The answer likely lies in the cramped legal
conception of expressive freedom that
prevailed at that time. In the 18th century,
the liberty of speech and the liberty of the
Cleve d B.rjo~urnallllN u I R, I0
press had far narrower meanings than they
do today. The former specified a purely
parliamentary privilege, attached only to
legislative debates. The latter, famously
articulated by Blackstone, was confined to
freedom from the prior restraint of a
licensor. That the framers and rarifiers of
the First Amendment barely bothered to
define their terms would suggest a contin-
uing adherence to these norms, because
departing from them would have required
extensive debate.
It was only after the First Amendment's rat-
ification that efforts to specify the scope of
its protection found their way into print. It
is in the writings of James Madison, Tunis
Wortman and George Hay' that the seeds
were sown for a modern, libertarian con-
ception of free speech and press, one that
transcended Blackstone to include a broad
impunity for political dissent. But this lib-
ertarian ideal - which did not fully surface
until 1800 - cannot plausibly be attributed
to those who wrought the First Amend-
ment. By word and deed, the founders
evinced a conception of expressive freedom
that was narrowly Blackstonian.
In 1787, James Wilson observed that,
"What is meant by the liberty of the press
is, that there should be no antecedent
restraint upon it; but that every author is
responsible when he attacks the security or
welfare of the government."' James
Madison, who later became the most
prominent exponent of the libertarian
view, deferred to Blackstone in the midst
of the founding. At the Virginia ratifying
convention in 1788, he stood by in silence
while his closest political supporter
defined freedom of the press as the
absence of a licensing act.
Even Thomas Jefferson, though he par-
doned political allies prosecuted under the
Sedition Act, proved all too willing to
seek post-publication punishment of his
political antagonists. Jefferson's commit-
ment to press freedom was limited even
further by his vision of federalism. He
wrote that, although Congress might be
powerless to regulate speech, the States
enjoyed broad authority to punish "the
overwhelming torrent of slander" un-
leashed by the American press.'
Thus, notwithstanding the enormous free-
dom actually practiced by the press, the
libertarian view of expressive freedom -
which repudiated the whole notion that
government may punish its critics -
remained a purely theoretical ideal, never
attaining the force of law until midway
through the 20th century. As a conse-
quence, dissenting voices in the 19th cen-
tury remained legally vulnerable to harsh
suppression. The most dramatic examples
involved punishment of anti-slavery speech
in the South and crackdowns on anti-war
speech in the North.
In the pre-Civil War South, state legisla-
tures enacted ferocious punishments for
anti-slavery speech. In the book Fettered
Freedom: Civil Liberties and the Slavery
Controversy, Russell B. Nye states that, in
1849, Virginia law imposed a one-year
jail term and a $500 fine for saying or
writing "that owners have no right in the
property of slaves." In North Carolina,
the punishment for this speech crime was
a lashing and one year in jail for the first
offense, and death for the second offense.
Russell Nye also states that, in Louisiana,
the penalty for conversation "having a
tendency to promote discontent among
free colored people, or insubordination
among slaves" ranged from 21 years of
hard labor to death.
In the North, President Lincoln's admin-
istration vigorously suppressed calls for a
peace treaty with the South and an end to
the Civil War. The most prominent target
of this censorship was Clement L.
\allandigham, a Democratic critic of
Lincolns war policy who was campaigning
for Ohio's governorship. Four days after
giving an anti-war speech, Vallandigham
was arrested in the middle of the night by
a company of I50 Union soldiers, acting
under orders from General Ambrose
Burnside that were later ratified by
Lincoln. Denied entry to Vallandigham's
home, the soldiers broke down his door,
seized him in his bedroom and transport-
ed him to prison in Cincinnati.
Brought before a military comrnission, he
was tried and convicted "of having
expressed sympathy" for the enemy and
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having uttered "disloyal sentiments and
opinions, with the object and purpose of
weakening the power of the Government
[to suppress] an unlawful rebellion."' For
his punishment, Lincoln chose banish-
ment. Vallandigham was delivered by a
detachment of Union cavalry, under a flag
of truce, to a Confederate outpost in
Tennessee. When the Chicago Times pub-
lished an angry protest, its editorial offices
were seized by Union troops.
The decades spanning the late 19th and
early 20th centuries featured a new chorus
of dissenting voices - socialists, feminists,
anarchists, and radical labor groups like the
Industrial Vorkers of the \World - voices
that were targeted for official suppression.
Throughout this period and deep into the
20th century, government officials sought
to punish such provocative sentiments as
advocating that women have access to birth
control, opposing U.S. involvement in
World War I, calling for "class struggle"
and "revolutionary mass action;' belonging
to the Cormnunist Party waving a red flag,
and burning the American flag.
In response to these prosecutions, the
Supreme Court developed a constitution-
al standard that, starting with the "clear
and present danger" test and culminating
in Brandenbutg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969), grew ever more protective of
speech. While originally permitting pun-
ishment for mere opposition to govern-
ment policies, the court subsequently
rejected criminal liability even for speech
that had a "dangerous tendency" to start
an insurrection. Finally, in Brandenbmig, the
court established an even more protective
standard, permitting punishment only for
incitement that is both intended and like-
ly to produce "imminent lawless action:'
Thus, the modern court has ruled that
Julian Bond could not be denied a seat in
the Georgia House of Representatives for
expressing "sympathy with, and support
[for] the men m this country who are
unwilling to respond to the military
draft:' Bond v, Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 120
(1966); and that an anti-war activist could
not be prosecuted for saying, "If they ever
make me carry a rifle the first man I want
to get in my sights is L.B.J.;' atts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969). Bearing
in mind that Algernon Sidney was
beheaded in 1683 for merely suggesting that
the king was accountable to the people,
these decisions indicate just how far our
law has evolved in affording protection
for dissident speech.
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